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Background: Patient outcome after serious brain injury is highly variable. Following a period of coma, some
patients recover while others progress into a vegetative state (unresponsive wakefulness syndrome) or minimally
conscious state. In both cases, assessment is difficult and misdiagnosis may be as high as 43%. Recent advances in
neuroimaging suggest a solution. Both functional magnetic resonance imaging and electroencephalography have
been used to detect residual cognitive function in vegetative and minimally conscious patients. Neuroimaging may
improve diagnosis and prognostication. These techniques are beginning to be applied to comatose patients soon
after injury. Evidence of preserved cognitive function may predict recovery, and this information would help families and
health providers. Complex ethical issues arise due to the vulnerability of patients and families, difficulties interpreting
negative results, restriction of communication to “yes” or “no” answers, and cost. We seek to investigate ethical issues in
the use of neuroimaging in behaviorally nonresponsive patients who have suffered serious brain injury. The objectives of
this research are to: (1) create an approach to capacity assessment using neuroimaging; (2) develop an ethics of welfare
framework to guide considerations of quality of life; (3) explore the impact of neuroimaging on families; and, (4) analyze
the ethics of the use of neuroimaging in comatose patients.
Methods/Design: Our research program encompasses four projects and uses a mixed methods approach. Project 1
asks whether decision making capacity can be assessed in behaviorally nonresponsive patients. We will specify cognitive
functions required for capacity and detail their assessment. Further, we will develop and pilot a series of scenarios
and questions suitable for assessing capacity. Project 2 examines the ethics of welfare as a guide for neuroimaging.
It grounds an obligation to explore patients’ interests, and we explore conceptual issues in the development of a
quality of life instrument adapted for neuroimaging. Project 3 will use grounded theory interviews to document families’
understanding of the patient’s condition, expectations of neuroimaging, and the impact of the results of neuroimaging.
Project 4 will provide an ethical analysis of neuroimaging to investigate residual cognitive function in comatose patients
within days of serious brain injury.
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Improvements in intensive care have led to an increased
survival rate following serious brain injury, but patient
outcome is highly variable. Following a period of coma,
some patients go on to make a good recovery, while
others progress into a vegetative state (unresponsive* Correspondence: cweijer@uwo.ca
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Patients in a vegetative state are awake but have no
awareness of self or environment, while patients in a
minimally conscious state show inconsistent evidence of
awareness. In both cases, assessment is very difficult and
depends on subjective interpretation of observed behav-
ior. Indeed, the misdiagnosis rate may be as high as 43%
in these groups [2-4].
Recent advances in neuroimaging suggest a solution.
Both functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and
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ness in vegetative and minimally conscious patients [5-13].
Neuroimaging may improve diagnosis and prognostication
in these patients. Indeed, neuroimaging has shown that a
subset of this patient group (17–19%), who consistently
satisfy the behavioral diagnostic criteria of the vegetative
state, retain conscious awareness undetectable through
bedside clinical examination [6,7,14]. Additionally, in at
least 3 reported cases, neuroimaging has been used to
communicate with patients diagnosed as vegetative or min-
imally conscious, raising the prospect of involving them in
decisions regarding their care [6,12,13]. These techniques
are now being studied in comatose patients soon after
serious brain injury. Evidence of preserved cognitive func-
tion in these patients may predict recovery, and, if so, this
information will be valuable to families weighing the
continuation—or withdrawal—of life-sustaining therapy.
Despite the promise of neuroimaging after serious
brain injury, complex ethical issues must be addressed
before the technology is broadly adopted. These ethical
issues arise due to difficulties interpreting negative neu-
roimaging results, restriction of communication to “yes”
or “no” answers, the vulnerability of patients and fam-
ilies, and the cost of fMRI. This research program seeks
to investigate ethical issues in the use of neuroimaging
in behaviorally nonresponsive patients who have suffered
serious brain injury. Both the research team and re-
search program are closely integrated with a Canadian
Institutes of Health Research (CIHR) funded project using
fMRI and EEG to measure residual cognitive function in
this patient population.
Our research program encompasses four main pro-
jects: (1) the assessment of decision making capacity in
behaviorally nonresponsive patients; (2) the ethics of
welfare as a moral framework for behaviorally nonre-
sponsive patients who retain covert awareness; (3) the
impact of neuroimaging on families of patients with a
serious brain injury; and (4) an analysis of ethical issues
in the use of neuroimaging in comatose patients within
days of serious brain injury. Our research program uses
a mixed methods approach, employing ethical analysis
and a variety of empirical techniques, including fMRI
studies of healthy volunteers, quality of life instrument
development, and interviews of families.
Neuroimaging in vegetative and minimally conscious
patients
To date, functional neuroimaging studies of patients fol-
lowing serious brain injury have focused on vegetative or
minimally conscious patients more than one year after
injury. In the vegetative state, patients exhibit regular
sleep-wake cycles, but show no awareness of self or their
environment [15,16]. The vegetative state can result from
traumatic and non-traumatic brain injuries, metabolic ordegenerative disorders, and congenital malformations of
the central nervous system [16]. Recovery of cognitive
function is unlikely more than 12 months after trauma to
the brain, and rare more than 3 months following non-
traumatic events [16]. Once medically stable, vegetative pa-
tients are typically cared for in a chronic care hospital or in
the family home with outside support.
Diagnosis of the vegetative state relies upon a variety
of bedside clinical examinations [17-19]. A diagnosis is
made after repeated examinations have yielded no evi-
dence of sustained, reproducible, purposeful, or volun-
tary behavioral response to visual, auditory, tactile, or
painful stimuli [16]. The minimally conscious state is a
relatively new diagnostic category, and describes patients
who show inconsistent but reproducible evidence of
awareness [20]. As we have noted, assessment of vegeta-
tive and minimally conscious patients is difficult and the
error rate in diagnosis may be as high as 43% [2-4].
Recent developments in neuroimaging have the poten-
tial to improve the accuracy of diagnosis in vegetative
and minimally conscious patients [5-12]. The majority of
neuroimaging methods to detect covert awareness use
willful modulation of brain activity as a proxy for behav-
ioral command following. In the first reported use of the
technique, a 23-year old patient, who had been diag-
nosed as vegetative for one year, imagined playing tennis
and moving from room to room in her house when
instructed to do so [5]. The hemodynamic changes in
her brain were unique to volitionally imagining these ac-
tivities, and her response was indistinguishable from
healthy controls [21].
This mental imagery paradigm was then used in 54
patients diagnosed as vegetative or minimally con-
scious [6]. Four patients (17%) clinically diagnosed as
vegetative could modulate their brain activity in response
to commands, thereby demonstrating covert awareness.
Moreover, investigators extended the mental imagery
technique to permit communication [6]. Patients were
asked a question and instructed to imagine playing tennis
if their answer was “yes”, and to imagine walking from
room to room in their house if their answer was “no”.
One patient, whose vegetative diagnosis was confirmed
over a five-year period, correctly answered several auto-
biographical questions pertaining to his father, siblings,
and the last country visited prior to injury [6]. Most re-
cently, a patient in London, Ontario, who had been diag-
nosed as vegetative for 12 years, was asked a series of
questions, including “are you in physical pain?” [13]. The
patient was able to answer the questions posed and this
exchange illustrates the potential clinical utility of neuro-
imaging communication in this patient population.
Recent technical developments have sought to im-
prove the efficiency of fMRI and utilize other neuroim-
aging modalities. One approach uses a similar fMRI
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merely activate the brain’s attention network, decreasing
the amount of imaging time required to assess command
following and communication [12,22]. Additionally, re-
cent innovations in EEG have aimed to develop a less
expensive and portable imaging technique that mitigates
the restricted access and cost of fMRI scanning time
[7,8,10]. Because patients do not need to be transported
to a hospital or fMRI research facility for EEG examin-
ation, the physical stress on the patient is decreased and
accessibility is broadened.
In a study funded by CIHR (2013–2018) and running
in parallel with our proposed research program, mem-
bers of our research team will use neuroimaging to build
a detailed map of residual cognitive function in 125
vegetative or minimally conscious patients following ser-
ious brain injury—the largest cohort ever studied. So far
data have been collected on 24 patients: patients are
young (35 years old on average at the time of neuroim-
aging assessment) and predominantly male (71%); a
slight majority are diagnosed as vegetative (58%); the
mechanism of injury is evenly divided between traumatic
and non-traumatic causes and the median time since in-
jury is 5 years (range 1–19 years at the time of neuroim-
aging assessment); 16 patients are cared for in a hospital
or a long term care facility, while 8 are cared for at
home. The study seeks to improve diagnostic accuracy
in these patients and identify new and objective prog-
nostic markers. Patients will undergo a broad battery of
neuroimaging tests using fMRI and EEG to document
preserved sound perception, speech perception and
comprehension, visual perception, attention, memory,
command following, and communication abilities. This
information will help refine the patient’s diagnosis by
documenting preserved function. Preserved cognitive
function may also predict better patient outcome. In one
small study in this patient population, speech perception
and comprehension correlated with signs of recovery six
months after neuroimaging [23].
Neuroimaging and comatose patients
Recently, these neuroimaging techniques have been ex-
tended to explore residual cognitive function in coma-
tose patients within days of serious brain injury. After a
serious brain injury, patients may be comatose for 2 to
4 weeks. Comatose patients are unarousably unconscious,
do not open their eyes, and only exhibit reflex responses to
stimulation [1]. Some patients go on to make a good recov-
ery, while others progress into vegetative or minimally con-
scious states. Currently, prognosis in coma is assessed
using clinical examination, structural neuroimaging, and
somatosensory evoked potentials (SSEPs: testing for intact
pathways between the median nerve and the sensory cor-
tex). After cardiac arrest, outcome is very poor in patientswith absent pupillary reflexes, absent or extensor motor
response to pain, or bilaterally absent SSEPs [24]. After
traumatic brain injury, additional predictors of poor out-
come include structural abnormalities (e.g., intraventricular
blood or subarachnoid hemorrhage) [25]. Despite these in-
dicators, prognostication involves subjective judgment and
experience on the part of the neurologist.
The majority of deaths subsequent to serious brain in-
jury follow a decision to withdraw life-sustaining therapy
(LST). A recent study of Canadian trauma centers re-
vealed a mortality rate of 32% following serious brain in-
jury and found that 70% of these deaths were associated
with the withdrawal of LST [26]. Many decisions to
withdraw LST occurred very early, with one half of
deaths within 72 hours of injury. According to the au-
thors, “[i]n some instances, this may be too early for
accurate neuroprognostication” [26]. The study further
documented considerable variation in mortality between
hospitals that persisted after adjustment for patient risk
factors. The authors concluded that “[t]his raises the
concern that differences in mortality between centres
may be partly due to variation in physicians’ perceptions
of long-term prognosis” [26]. Families of patients with
serious brain injury may perceive a “window of oppor-
tunity” for the withdrawal of care to avoid undesirable
patient outcomes, extending from the time of injury to
the point when the patient is no longer dependent on
mechanical ventilation [27]. Families considering with-
drawal of LSTs need high levels of communication, in-
cluding access to accurate prognostic information [28].
In the CIHR-funded study (2013–2018) referred to
above, members of our research team will use neuroim-
aging to build a detailed map of residual cognitive func-
tion in an additional 125 patients who are comatose
following serious brain injury. They will use techniques
developed for patients in vegetative and minimally con-
scious states and apply them to comatose patients in the
intensive care unit within days of injury. So far data has
been collected on 12 patients: the mean age is 50 years
old and patients are predominantly male (75%); all were
comatose and mechanically ventilated in an intensive
care unit; the median time since injury is 19.5 days. The
data indicate that fMRI and EEG can be applied in this
setting and, in a proportion of comatose patients, covert
cognitive function can be detected. Improving access to
accurate and timely prognostic information after serious
brain injury holds the prospect of improving treatment
decisions and patient care.
Ethical and scientific controversies
Despite the promise of neuroimaging after serious brain
injury, the scientific and ethics communities reacted to
early findings with skepticism. After the first report
of covert awareness in a vegetative patient [5], critics
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of command following [29,30]. It was argued that verbal
stimuli can produce spontaneous neural activation, and
thus the observed hemodynamic changes could merely
be unconscious speech processing. More recently, others
have questioned EEG studies in behaviorally nonresponsive
patients [7]. Critics argued that the statistical methods
employed were not sufficiently conservative, thereby risk-
ing false positive results [31].
We contend that fMRI responses to the mental im-
agery task do not represent a reflex or unconscious
speech processing [14,32]. Hemodynamic activity is ob-
served in areas of the brain associated with motor activ-
ity and spatial navigation that are distinct from the
auditory cortex. Further, neural activation is sustained
for 30 second periods until the patient is instructed to
“relax”, and as a result is unlikely to be linked to uncon-
scious speech processing. Moreover, the mental imagery
paradigm has been used to communicate with at least 3
patients [6,12,13]. Patients have correctly answered bio-
graphical questions, which cannot be explained by ap-
peal to unconscious speech processing.
Concerns raised about the validity of statistical methods
used in our EEG research have been addressed in part by
appealing to fMRI data as corroborating evidence [33].
Moreover, our EEG technique detailed in the Lancet classi-
fies 75% of healthy participants as aware. In contrast, statis-
tical methods proposed by critics produce variable results
on identical control data [31]. Because healthy participants
are known to be conscious, it stands to reason that statis-
tical methods that are unable to detect awareness in this
group may not detect covert awareness, when it exists, in
behaviourally nonresponsive patients [33].
In the ethics literature, a variety of concerns have been
raised about neuroimaging after serious brain injury.
Much of the discussion has focused on the possibility of
behaviorally nonresponsive patients participating in deci-
sions regarding their own care. Indeed, if a patient is
able to communicate via neuroimaging, one can imagine
a number of questions that might be posed regarding
care. For example, one might ask whether a patient
wishes to be resuscitated in the event of a cardiac arrest.
Critics point out—correctly we think—that before such
questions are posed, patients’ decision making capacity
must first be established. Given that neuroimaging com-
munication only provides for “yes” or “no” responses to
questions and patients cannot ask questions of their
own, some have argued that it is not possible to evaluate
decision making capacity [34-37]. If we cannot assess de-
cision making capacity, it is suggested that the clinical
utility of neuroimaging is undercut [34-37].
Others ask “if we have evidence of consciousness in a
patient previously thought to be in a vegetative state, is
it permissible to withdraw life-sustaining treatment?”[38]. The moral permissibility of withdrawal of LSTs, in-
cluding artificial nutrition and hydration, from patients
in vegetative state is widely accepted. Evidence of con-
sciousness, however, is thought by some to be a reason
not to withdraw LSTs. Indeed, in several well-publicized
legal cases it has been suggested that vegetative patients
undergo neuroimaging.
Some have been critical of this view and have said that
the discovery of covert consciousness in a vegetative pa-
tient does not provide us with a clear reason to keep the
patient alive. They argue that “[i]f such patients suffer
they can be harmed by continuing treatment; there may
be stronger reasons in terms of non-maleficence and the
best interests of the patient to allow them to die” [38]. If
correct, this would mitigate the utility of neuroimaging
in ethical and legal controversies regarding the with-
drawal of care.
Finally, it has been argued that the clinical application
of neuroimaging may have a negative impact on the
emotional well-being or finances of the families of pa-
tients with serious brain injuries [34,35,39]. This derives
in part from the lack of knowledge regarding the precise
correlation between physical findings at the bedside
exam, and neuroimaging results. Because we know so lit-
tle about consciousness and its precise relation to neural
mechanisms, it is argued that we must proceed with
caution before clinical use of neuroimaging in patients
after serious brain injury is endorsed [35,40].
Study objectives
The overarching goal of this project is to investigate eth-
ical issues in the use of neuroimaging in behaviorally
nonresponsive patients who have suffered serious brain
injury. We will build a lasting collaboration between phi-
losophers, physicians, and neuroscientists that draws
upon the strengths of each discipline, produces signifi-
cant contributions to the scholarly literature, advances
ethical practice in neuroimaging, and ultimately im-
proves the care of patients with serious brain injuries.
Specific objectives are to:
1. Create a conceptual framework for capacity
assessment in behaviorally nonresponsive patients
using neuroimaging and demonstrate its feasibility
in healthy controls;
2. Develop an ethics of welfare framework to guide the
use of neuroimaging in behaviorally nonresponsive
patients and apply it to considerations of quality
of life;
3. Explore the impact of neuroimaging on the families
of behaviorally nonresponsive patients; and,
4. Provide the first sustained ethical analysis of the use
of neuroimaging to detect residual cognitive function
in comatose patients.
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Our research program uses a mixed methods approach,
employing ethical analysis and a variety of empirical
techniques, including fMRI studies of healthy volunteers,
quality of life instrument development, and interviews of
families. Ethical analysis in bioethics is not amenable to
the degree of a priori methodological specification that
is expected of empirical research. Statistical rigor and re-
producibility are indispensable features of science, neces-
sitating the clear and up-front statement of hypotheses
and experimental methods. High-quality ethical analysis,
on the other hand, relies neither on statistical rigor nor
on reproducibility. Rather, it begins with the articulation
of clear and important questions and is realized in the
construction of sound arguments in peer-reviewed pub-
lications and policy reports. For each question, an exten-
sive review of the scholarly literature will document and
critically analyze arguments proffered for and against
particular positions. Where gaps exist, we will develop
our own ethical arguments. The ethical analysis will then
seek to synthesize foundational documents, regulations,
and existing and novel arguments into a coherent pos-
ition. Where disagreement among the various sources
cannot be resolved by ethical analysis, the details of the
dispute will be documented. Sound ethical analysis relies
upon a foundation of reliable data. Accordingly, we plan
to conduct several empirical studies to inform, comple-
ment, and enrich planned ethical analyses. Detailed
methods for the fMRI studies of healthy volunteers,
quality of life instrument development, and family inter-
views are provided in the project descriptions below.
Project 1: Assessing decision making capacity in
behaviorally nonresponsive patients
Providing informed consent for medical treatment re-
quires the capacity to make autonomous decisions
[41-44]. Given that a proportion of behaviorally non-
responsive patients with severe brain injury can now
communicate using neuroimaging, it is timely to ask
whether they can participate in decisions regarding their
own medical care. As we explain above, a number of au-
thors have argued that decision making capacity cannot
be assessed using neuroimaging [35-37]. We have re-
cently argued that capacity assessment in such patients
is—in principle at least—possible [45].
Our argument proceeds by analyzing the MacArthur
Competency Assessment Tool [43] and decomposing
the standard elements of capacity—understanding, appre-
ciation, reasoning, and communication—into constitutive
cognitive functions measurable through neuroimaging
[45]. By reducing the elements of capacity to compo-
nents that can be evaluated using neuroimaging, we argue
that a decisionally capable yet behaviorally nonresponsive
patient may demonstrate decision making capacity throughneuroimaging. In practice, this procedure may utilize a bat-
tery of validated neuropsychological instruments adapted
for neuroimaging communication, which probe these con-
stitutive components. We are careful to point out that the
threshold for decision making capacity must be calibrated
to the stakes of the treatment decision. It may be that
capacity assessment using neuroimaging turns out to be
applicable only to low and medium stakes treatment deci-
sions, and is inappropriate for high stakes (e.g., end of life)
decisions.
Having set out this provisional conceptual framework
for capacity assessment in behaviorally nonresponsive
patients using neuroimaging, further work is required.
We envision that the assessment of decision making
capacity in these patients will involve a two-step process.
First, it must be shown that a patient possesses the cog-
nitive functions necessary to make any decision regard-
ing care. Second, once this has been established, it must
be shown that the patient is capable of making the par-
ticular decision at stake. In order to address the first
step, we aim to (1) provide a list of cognitive functions
that may defensibly constitute understanding, appreci-
ation, and reasoning, and (2) detail the assessment of
these cognitive functions using neuroimaging. In order
to address the second step, we will (3) develop a series
of questions suitable for neuroimaging communication
to assess a patient’s capacity to make a particular deci-
sion, and (4) demonstrate the feasibility of the neuroim-
aging assessment of decision making capacity in healthy
controls. Here we set out two subprojects to achieve
these goals.
Subproject 1a: Cognitive functions underpinning decision
making capacity
In our first subproject, we will specify constitutive cogni-
tive functions necessary for decision making capacity.
Decision making capacity is comprised of understanding,
appreciation, reasoning, and communication. Since it
has been demonstrated that neuroimaging can be used
to communicate a choice, we will focus our analysis on
the remaining elements. We will argue that each of these
elements is underpinned by a complex set of cognitive
functions that constitute the higher order mental opera-
tions referred to as understanding, appreciation, and
reasoning. For example, standard neuropsychiatric in-
struments measure the appreciation of medical informa-
tion as a product of consequential reasoning [43]. A
patient appreciates the choice at hand if he or she can
identify the consequences both of choosing and refusing
treatment. Underlying consequential reasoning is a set of
simpler cognitive functions that, taken together, allow a
patient to appreciate information. These functions may
include the ability to localize one’s self in space and time,
the ability to relate medical information to oneself as
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ordering in the environment. By utilizing an extensive lit-
erature on psychometrics, particularly those that probe ab-
stract reasoning abilities (e.g., Wechsler Intelligence Scale,
Woodcock Johnson Psychoeducational Scale), we will de-
velop a model of the cognitive functions necessary for ap-
preciation, understanding, and reasoning in the clinical
context. Associating the cognitive profiles with neuroim-
aging techniques to assess the cognitive functions will pro-
vide a detailed approach to ascertain whether a patient
possesses the cognitive functions needed to make any
decision regarding care.
Subproject 1b: Demonstrating the feasibility of decision
making capacity assessment using neuroimaging
Decision making capacity is decision specific [41]. Once
it has been established that a patient possesses the requis-
ite cognitive functions outlined above, it remains to be
shown that he or she is capable of making a particular
decision in the clinical context. In this subproject, we seek
to develop a series of questions suitable for neuroimaging
communication to assess a patient’s capacity to make
particular decisions, and to demonstrate the feasibility of
this approach by studying healthy volunteers. We will
develop a series of medical scenarios appropriate for
healthy volunteers that correspond to low, medium, and
high stakes medical decisions. Using criteria for capacity
in the Ontario Health Care Consent Act (1996) [46], we
will construct a series of questions for each scenario that
evaluates the participant’s understanding and appreciation
of the decision. We aim to answer two related questions
with this study: (1) How many questions evaluating deci-
sion making capacity can be posed in one neuroimaging
session? (2) Can healthy volunteers reliably demonstrate
that they possess the capacity to make decisions regarding
care through neuroimaging?
To investigate these questions, we will utilize recent
work by Naci and colleagues [12,22], which details a
method of neuroimaging communication using a partici-
pant’s attention network. This method reduces the scan-
ning time needed to ask questions relative to previous
techniques. In 92% of healthy participants, this method
accurately decoded answers within 5.6 minutes [22].
This suggests that it is possible for a healthy participant
to answer 10 questions in a 60-minute scanning session
with a high degree of accuracy.
Ensuring the reliability of effects at the single-subject
level is an important criterion for successful application
of this method to testing individual patients in future
studies. Following previous work on single subject fMRI
techniques in healthy participants [21,22], our study will
recruit 20 healthy volunteers. Volunteers will be native
English speakers between the ages of 18 and 60, have no
history of neurologic or psychiatric illness and normalhearing. Data will be acquired using a 3-T Siemens Tim
Trio system, with a 32-channel head coil, at the Robarts
Research Institute in London, Ontario. Data analysis will
be performed using the Statistical Parametric Mapping 8
(Wellcome Institute of Cognitive Neurology, http://www.
fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm8/), Automatic Analysis
software (www.cusacklab.org), and the MarsBar SPM tool-
box (http://marsbar.sourceforge.net/).
Because this neuroimaging method [12,22] utilizes
functional activation of the attention network as a proxy
for behavioural command following, a high level of con-
fidence in the results is necessary to avoid type I errors.
To ensure conservative testing, the results of each com-
munication scan will be tested against a priori hypoth-
eses derived from an initial localizer scan acquired for
each individual participant. This localizer scan will map
an individual’s attention network, and determine whether
all or parts of the canonical attention network, observed
at the group-level, are expected to be activated during se-
lective attention in a functional communication scan for
that individual participant. Whole-brain analysis of the
fMRI data from the localizer scan will be used to deter-
mine significant brain activity, and, thus, localize the at-
tention network in each participant. Based on the brain
activity peaks within each participant’s attention network,
two regions of interest (ROIs) will be determined with
the MarsBar toolbox, to analyze brain-responses during
the communication scans. Confining analysis within these
independently defined and subject-specific ROIs will en-
hance sensitivity to true positive effects at the single-
subject level.
To test a participant’s decision-making capacity in the
communication scans brief yet realistic medical scenar-
ios will be read to participants as they lie in the fMRI
scanner. We will ask a set of 10 questions to assess the
participant’s understanding and appreciation of the treat-
ment choice in each scenario. Binary (“yes” or “no”) an-
swers based on the fMRI data will be compared to the
volunteer’s verbally reported answers. Scores of greater
than or equal to 9 correct answers will be considered a
“success”. Decoding accuracy at the group level will be
determined with a binomial test. With a sample size of
20 participants, statistical significance (p < 0.05) will be
achieved if 14 or more participants succeed. If the true
probability of success is 80% [22], 20 participants provide a
power of 80%. If successful, this study will be the first dem-
onstration of capacity assessment using neuroimaging-
based communication methods.
Project 2: The ethics of welfare as a moral framework for
behaviorally nonresponsive patients who retain awareness
The assessment of decision making capacity is an im-
portant problem after serious brain injury [45]. However,
clinical decision making questions (e.g., “Do you give us
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are only one type of question that might be asked of
these patients. Another kind of question seeks reports of
subjective experience (e.g., “Are you in pain?”), which
have central relevance to the daily lives of patients.
While questions related to medical decision making are
grounded in respect for autonomy, questions exploring
the subjective experience of patients may be viewed
through the lens of the ethics of welfare. In this project,
we examine the ethics of welfare as a moral framework
to guide the use of neuroimaging in behaviorally nonre-
sponsive patients after serious brain injury.
According to the ethics of welfare, for any moral deci-
sion, we must give due consideration to the interests of
those affected by our actions [47]. The fact that an in-
dividual is sentient—capable of experiencing pain or
pleasure—gives him or her a specific set of interests
that must be taken into account in ethical decision mak-
ing. Accordingly, it would be morally wrong to ignore
these interests or to treat them as less important than our
own [47-49]. It is important to note that the moral weight
of interests does not depend on the possession of rational
capacities; it is just as wrong to let a young child suffer
needlessly as it is to allow an autonomous adult to suffer
needlessly. As the ethics of welfare does not depend on
the presence of clearly functioning rational faculties, it
may be a useful approach in behaviorally nonresponsive
patients after serious brain injury if decision making cap-
acity cannot be verified.
The ethics of welfare helps direct the questions that
might be asked of patients with serious brain injury.
Communication through neuroimaging may allow some
patients to express their interests, allowing families and
health providers to take appropriate action. Indeed, just
knowing that a patient is capable of experiencing pain
and pleasure is sufficient grounds to take these interests
seriously and may influence care (e.g., administering an-
algesia prior to a potentially painful intervention). To de-
velop the ethics of welfare framework we will: (1) argue
that patients after serious brain injury who demonstrate
signs of conscious awareness should be regarded as sen-
tient; (2) explore the implications of an ethics of welfare
approach to end of life decisions in behaviorally nonre-
sponsive patients; and (3) develop quality of life mea-
sures that can be administered through neuroimaging
communication.
Subproject 2a: Conscious awareness and sentience in
behaviorally nonresponsive patients
Patients who successfully complete the mental imagery
paradigm have demonstrated that they have a number of
preserved cognitive functions, including auditory pro-
cessing, speech processing, short-term memory, and ru-
dimentary executive function. Does this imply that theyare also sentient? In this subproject, we will pursue and
develop three lines of argument to support the relation-
ship between conscious awareness and sentience. The
first line of argumentation appeals to the neuroanatom-
ical basis of awareness and sentience. If the functional
integrity of neural structures required for sentience is a
subset of those required for awareness, then identifi-
cation of awareness is evidence of sentience as well. A
second line of argument considers the role of indirect
markers of pain, including biomarkers (e.g., elevated
heart rate or blood pressure) or neuroimaging data equiva-
lent to healthy controls in “pain states” [50-52]. Third, in
the subset of patients with whom communication is pos-
sible, the ability to experience pain or pleasure can be
tested to allow patients to volitionally report that a stimu-
lus is painful.
Subproject 2b: The ethics of welfare and end-of-life
decisions in behaviorally nonresponsive patients
Some have argued that the detection of sentience in be-
haviorally nonresponsive patients provides a strong rea-
son to withdraw LST [36,38,53]. It is suggested that
sentience combined with profound neurological disabil-
ity may lead to terrible suffering. In such cases, there is
an imperative to reduce suffering by allowing patients to
die. While this view is consistent with the ethics of wel-
fare, we will dispute the authors’ assumption that these
patients are living lives of terrible suffering. While it is
true that some members of the public and physicians
treating patients in vegetative and minimally conscious
states have strong intuitions about their subjective expe-
riences [54,55], we will argue that intuition may provide
poor insight into what life is like after a serious brain
injury. Indeed, evidence of the subjective experiences
of patients with a comparable disorder, locked-in syn-
drome, seems to contradict these intuitions. In locked-in
syndrome, otherwise cognitively intact patients are un-
able to move their limbs or speak, but they may be able
to communicate through vertical eye movements. In one
study of the quality of life of patients with locked-in syn-
drome, a majority professed happiness, while only a
minority were miserable [56]. In another study, the self-
reported scores of locked-in patients for mental health,
general health, and bodily pain were close to those of
healthy controls [57]. We will argue that an ethics of
welfare requires that—where possible—we communicate
with patients after serious brain injury and allow them
to report their own subjective quality of life.
Subproject 2c: Measuring quality of life in behaviorally
nonresponsive patients
In this project we will undertake the preliminary devel-
opment of quality of life (QoL) instruments for use in
behaviorally nonresponsive patients after serious brain
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by many aspects of life of which health is only one”;
health-related QoL, on the other hand, is a narrower
construct, and focuses on the assessment of the individ-
ual’s subjective health experience [58]. The application
of QoL instruments to neurological disease poses chal-
lenges, and its application to entirely behaviorally non-
responsive patients has not yet been attempted [59].
Indeed, the development of a QoL instrument in this pa-
tient setting faces very serious challenges: patients can-
not be interviewed about their values post brain injury;
patients cannot complete other validated QoL instru-
ments; and responses to questions are limited to “yes” or
“no” [60-62]. Recognizing that these limitations under-
mine standard methods for QoL instrument develop-
ment, we will convene an interdisciplinary group of
experts (including QoL methodologists, philosophers,
neuroscientists, health care workers, and family mem-
bers of patients who have suffered a serious brain injury)
in a two day workshop to address the problem. The pur-
pose of the meeting is (1) to develop an approach to as-
sess overall QoL in behaviorally nonresponsive patients,
(2) to develop an approach to assess the health-related
QoL in these patients, and (3) to develop strategies to
validate these instruments. In developing novel QoL in-
struments, we hope to gain further insight into the inter-
ests and lived experiences of behaviorally nonresponsive
patients in order to positively impact their care.
Project 3: The impact of neuroimaging on families of
patients with serious brain injury
Families play an important role for patients diagnosed as
vegetative or minimally conscious after serious brain
injury. They act as proxy decision makers, assist in pro-
viding care, and suffer the emotional strain that accom-
panies chronic illness and uncertainty [63-67]. Families
commonly believe that patients possess conscious aware-
ness despite the lack of any behavioral evidence [68-70].
Neuroimaging may provide insights into residual cogni-
tive function, including covert conscious awareness in
some patients, but it is unknown how best to inform
families of the risks and benefits of neuroimaging, or to
what degree they can comprehend this complex infor-
mation. The impact of test results on families is also un-
known. While positive results may be met with a sense
of optimism or even vindication, they also raise the pos-
sibility that the patient may be suffering. Negative results
may be difficult to understand, as they could indicate
that a patient is not aware or there has been a failure of
the test conditions (e.g., a patient moves too much, has
fallen asleep, or cannot concentrate adequately on the
experimental tasks). In this case, test results may be a
source of confusion or distress for families who believe
deeply that the patient is aware.In this project, we will explore the impact of neu-
roimaging on the families of behaviorally nonrespon-
sive patients. We seek to gain insight into families’
(1) knowledge of the patient’s medical condition, includ-
ing their beliefs about the patient’s preserved cognitive
function and prognosis, (2) reasons for enrolling the pa-
tient in research and their expectations regarding neuro-
imaging, and (3) experience of research participation and
their suggestions as to how study procedures may be im-
proved. We further seek to (4) develop educational mate-
rials for families considering neuroimaging for a patient
following serious brain injury.
Our first three goals will be addressed in a qualitative
interview study using the grounded theory constructivist
approach of Charmaz [71]. This approach focuses on
understanding participants’ experiences and how they
assign meaning to these experiences by gathering rich
data through in-depth interviews. English speaking fam-
ily members who are acting as the surrogate decision
maker for patients participating in our neuroimaging
research program on serious brain injury at Western
University are eligible for this study. Patients must have
a diagnosis of vegetative or minimally conscious state
and be at least 1 year post-injury. Qualitative sampling is
purposive and requires that enough data are generated
to sufficiently explore the issues under investigation
[72]. The data reaches a point of saturation when no
new information or themes are being generated; at this
point, interviewing stops. We will interview approxi-
mately 30 family members, which should generate suffi-
cient data to reach saturation [72].
Participants will be identified through our program of
research on serious brain injury. Typically, family mem-
bers of patients approach our research program directly
via our advertized contact details and first contact is
with our CIHR-funded research associate. The research
associate will inform potential participants of this quali-
tative study, obtain verbal consent, and arrange a time
for the interview. Written consent will be obtained at
the time of the face-to-face interview. Interviews will be
conducted by a doctoral student with experience in
qualitative interviewing and supervised by a medical
sociologist (Webster).
There will be two 90 minute interviews: the first will
occur prior to the neuroimaging session, the second will
occur after the completion of the neuroimaging study
and feedback of study results. The interview guide will
map onto the goals of our research while still being flex-
ible enough to allow issues to emerge from the inter-
views that were not pre-determined by the study team.
It will consist of topics beginning with the participant’s
relationship with the patient, followed by questions per-
taining to his or her beliefs about the patient’s condition
and why he or she is participating in neuroimaging
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will rely on prompts to allow for differences in percep-
tion and experience between participants to emerge dur-
ing the course of the interview. The interview guide will
be pilot tested with at least one participant to ensure
that the flow of questions is well ordered and easily
understood. Interviews will be digitally recorded and
transcribed verbatim and once de-identified will become
the text that is analyzed by the team. The transcripts
will be imported into a qualitative software program
(NVivo 10) that helps organize and retrieve data.
In grounded theory, emergent themes are not just used
to explore an issue, but also to construct a cohesive idea or
theory about an investigated phenomenon. This analysis
emphasizes the connection between theory, concepts, and
empirical data through the constant comparative method.
Central elements of grounded-theory data analysis include:
some form of purposive sampling; simultaneous data col-
lection and analysis that allows for emerging themes to be
pursued; identification of social processes within the data;
inductive development of abstract theories or categories to
explain these processes; comparing, connecting and inte-
grating concepts; and, integration of these concepts or
themes into a theoretical framework that describes and ex-
plains the phenomenon under study.
The analysis of study data will occur in the following
steps: coding, memoing, member checking and theory/
model formulation. Codes identify features of the data
that are pertinent to the research questions, and organize
data into more concise ideas that can be eventually
grouped into themes. Open coding is performed to get a
more general feel for the content of the data. Axial cod-
ing explores relationships between these codes. Selective
coding involves integrating these codes or concepts into
a core explanatory theory. Four members of the research
team will independently read and code the first two inter-
view transcripts. They will then meet to compare their
independent analyses and develop a codebook that will
be used by the doctoral student in the subsequent ana-
lysis. The interviewer’s thoughts and comments through-
out data collection will be recorded and analyzed with
the goal of focusing thoughts around the emerging con-
cepts. Participants will also be sent a summary of the pre-
liminary analysis. Finally, we will formulate a general
theory/model about the nature of participants’ experi-
ences related to serious brain injury and neuroimaging.
This will be accomplished through a series of team meet-
ings involving all investigators, in which the relationships
between the themes will be summarized. Our analysis
will be reflexive by identifying and considering the personal
biases of the research team during data analysis. The inter-
view results will be used, in part, to inform and refine the
development of a set of educational materials for families
considering neuroimaging for a patient following seriousbrain injury. The interview results will allow us to identify
common misconceptions and address them directly in
educational materials and to incorporate family member
suggestions to improve communication with families.
Project 4: Ethical issues in the use of neuroimaging in
comatose patients with serious brain injury
There are important—and morally relevant—differences
between the population of vegetative and minimally
conscious patients undergoing neuroimaging and the
population of comatose patients now being studied with
neuroimaging to map residual cognitive function. The
most striking difference is the proximity to injury. In our
program of research in serious brain injury at Western
University since 2012, the time since injury among vegeta-
tive and minimally conscious patients who underwent neu-
roimaging (n = 24) was a median of 5 years; the median
time since injury among comatose patients (n = 12) was
19.5 days. As we have explained, the first days and weeks
following a serious brain injury are a time of considerable
prognostic uncertainty, and this complicates decisions
faced by health care providers and families. The decision
whether to continue—or withdraw—LST is prominent in
the days and weeks following injury. Serious brain injury is
a catastrophic event, and families of recently injured pa-
tients are unlikely to have come to terms with the injury or
implications for the patient’s functional recovery [69,73].
As a result, families of comatose patients may be particu-
larly vulnerable, fail to understand the patient’s medical
condition, and have difficulty comprehending the purpose,
harms, and benefits of neuroimaging. Finally, while pilot
studies in comatose patients have revealed residual cogni-
tive function, no patient to date has demonstrated covert
awareness. As a result, questions related to sentience, com-
munication, and decision making capacity are likely not
relevant to these patients—at least not at this moment in
their illness trajectory.
Despite the unique challenges posed by conducting
neuroimaging in comatose patients following serious
brain injury, to the best of our knowledge they remain
unaddressed in the ethics literature. In this project, we
aim to provide the first sustained ethical analysis of the
use of neuroimaging to detect residual cognitive func-
tion in comatose patients. Specifically, we will (1) deter-
mine whether individual neuroimaging results ought to
be shared with the families of comatose patients, and (2)
explore potential interactions between neuroimaging re-
sults and decisions regarding the use of life-sustaining
therapy in comatose patients.
Subproject 4a: Sharing individual research results with
families of comatose patients
In the first subproject we ask whether and, if so, how in-
dividual neuroimaging results ought to be shared with
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sidual cognitive function in comatose patients is experi-
mental. It is conducted with the oversight of a research
ethics board and the informed consent of next-of-kin. It
is widely accepted that summary research results ought
to be shared with participants once the study has been
concluded [74,75]. The disclosure of individual research
results, however, remains controversial, particularly in
this context. In previous work, we argued that individual
research results ought to be disclosed if four criteria are
fulfilled: (1) disclosure does not seriously undermine the
scientific validity of the study; (2) the results are inform-
ative and reasonably reliable; (3) the potential benefits
of disclosure to the participant outweigh the potential
harms; and (4) the participant consents to be informed
of the results (Graham et al., submitted). Here we will
apply these criteria to the disclosure of neuroimaging re-
sults in the intensive care unit context. Key issues will
include the informativeness and reliability of neuroimag-
ing results, and the benefits and harms of disclosure. If
we conclude that individual results ought to be shared,
we will develop a document outlining best practices for
disclosure of neuroimaging results in comatose patients.
Subproject 4b: Neuroimaging and decisions about LST in
comatose patients
In the second subproject we will explore potential inter-
actions between neuroimaging results and decisions to
continue or withdraw LST in comatose patients. As we
have seen, decisions to withdraw LST may occur within
72 hours of injury, too soon in some cases to have an
accurate prognostic picture [26]. A legally authorized
proxy decision maker may refuse or withdraw any med-
ical care—be it mechanical ventilation or artificial nutri-
tion and hydration—inconsistent with the patient’s prior
expressed wishes or values [76]. Despite this, proxy deci-
sion makers may be very reluctant to withdraw artificial
nutrition or hydration [27]. As a result, proxy decision
makers seeking to prevent an undesired neurological
outcome may feel compelled to act in the face of prog-
nostic uncertainty due to a perceived “window of oppor-
tunity” to withdraw treatment while the patient remains
dependent on a ventilator. We will argue that ethical de-
cisions regarding LSTs should both respect the prior
expressed wishes and values of the patient and be based
on reasonably obtainable and reliable prognostic infor-
mation. In some cases, a grave prognosis may be evident
soon after injury based on clinical examination and
structural neuroimaging. In other cases, neuroimaging
to map residual cognitive function may provide import-
ant clues to a comatose patient’s prognosis [23,77]. If the
patient’s prior expressed wishes involve not wanting to
“end up vegetative” or otherwise profoundly neurologic-
ally disabled, we will argue that a valid proxy decisionmust take account of available prognostic information.
When the prognosis is unclear and functional neuroim-
aging is available, there is a prima facie obligation to
build a clearer prognostic picture before a decision re-
garding LST is undertaken.
Ethical considerations
Subproject 1b (Demonstrating the feasibility of decision
making capacity assessment using neuroimaging) and
project 3 (The impact of neuroimaging on families of pa-
tients with serious brain injury) involve research on hu-
man participants. Both studies have been reviewed and
approved by the University of Western Ontario Research
Ethics Board for Health Sciences Research Involving
Human Subjects (#100070 and #104684). Informed con-
sent will be obtained from all study participants.
Discussion
Serious brain injuries place an enormous burden on pa-
tients, families, and the healthcare system. Currently, 1.4
million Canadians are living with the effects of brain in-
jury, with 50,000 new cases occurring each year. Patient
outcome after serious brain injury is highly variable. Fol-
lowing a period of coma lasting days or weeks, some pa-
tients make a good recovery, while others progress into
a vegetative or minimally conscious state. As it is diffi-
cult to predict who will make a good recovery after ser-
ious brain injury, families and physicians are forced to
make treatment decisions in the face of uncertainty. Fur-
ther, the diagnosis of vegetative and minimally conscious
states is itself difficult, with error rates as high as 43%.
Recent advances in neuroimaging allow for the detection
of intact brain function that cannot be found by routine
bedside examination. Neuroimaging offers the prospect
of improved prediction of outcome and increased diag-
nostic accuracy. But neuroimaging after serious brain in-
jury poses profound ethical questions that must be
answered before it can be applied widely.
Each of our four projects addresses an important eth-
ical issue, and is designed to both add to our knowledge
of the ethics of neuroimaging and contribute to ethical
practice. Project 1 seeks to develop an approach to the
assessment of decision making capacity in behaviorally
nonresponsive patients using neuroimaging. This work
will contribute to the broader literature on capacity as-
sessment in patients with neurological impairments. If it
is applied to the patient setting successfully, it will allow
patients with preserved capacity the opportunity to par-
ticipate in their own care decisions. Project 2 will argue
that behaviorally nonresponsive patients with covert
awareness are very likely sentient and will explore the
application of an ethics of welfare to these patients. This
work will contribute to the literature on the ethics of
welfare in bioethics. Our efforts to develop quality of life
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resent the first instance of systematically exploring the
subjective experiences of these patients, and offer the
prospect of improving patient quality of life. Project 3
explores the impact of neuroimaging on the families of
patients after serious brain injury. Little is currently
known, and the interviews will further our understanding
of family knowledge, family expectations, and the impact
of neuroimaging on these views. The educational materials
developed will ensure that families considering neuroimag-
ing are better informed. Project 4 explores the use of neu-
roimaging in a new setting, namely comatose patients
within days of serious brain injury. To our knowledge, this
will be the first sustained ethical analysis of these issues.
Our work will have an impact on how families are in-
formed about neuroimaging results and seeks ultimately to
improve decisions regarding life sustaining therapy.
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